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Abstract 
 
Occupational fleet safety is an emerging issue for organisations across Australia and overseas. 
Research has shown that road crashes are the most common cause of work-related fatalities, 
injuries and absences from work. Changes in industry/employer accountability, business 
processes, Occupational Health and Safety, Chain of Responsibility (COR), Workers 
Compensation legislation, insurance and third party coverage, and a generally more litigious 
environment require industry to address and subsequently develop more comprehensive 
programs to improve fleet safety. Historically, organisations opt for a silver bullet or singular 
reactive strategy towards fleet safety, determined primarily from an asset management 
approach. Research has revealed that a single reactive approach is ineffective in improving 
long-term occupational fleet safety. This paper focuses on examples of case study research 
conducted by the Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland (CARRS-Q), 
involving fleet safety of three large and diverse Queensland and nationwide industry 
organisations. From analysis and investigation of vehicle crash/incident data, industry focus 
groups, and organisational safety and work-related driving survey questionnaires, current fleet 
safety practices and high risk groups and processes are identified. Subsequently, data from 
research and analysis reveals inadequacies in fleet safety practices current within 
organisations and enables the identification of future occupational fleet safety intervention 
strategies.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Fleet and work-related road safety is an emerging issue for organisations in Australia and 
overseas. Research conducted in Australia reveal that road crashes are the most common 
cause of work-related fatalities, injuries and absences from work (Haworth et al., 2000), with 
the average time lost being greater than any other workplace claim (Stewart-Bogle, 1999; 
WA, 2003). In recent years changes in industry/employer accountability, business processes, 
Occupational Health and Safety (OH&S), Chain of Responsibility (COR), Workers 
Compensation legislation, insurance and third party coverage, and a generally more litigious 
environment require industry to develop better benchmarking along with more comprehensive 
programs to improve fleet safety (Wishart & Davey, 2004). 
 
Vincent (1997) suggested that people who drive in the course of their employment form the 
majority of drivers on the road on any given work day, but have been overlooked by road 
safety and OH&S specialists (cited in Murray, 2002), despite the vehicle being classed as a 
workplace by Workplace Health and Safety legislation. However, this may be about to 
change, as OH&S appears to be moving in the direction of transport and there are increasing 
calls for fleet safety to be managed under an OH&S framework (Haworth et al., 2000; Murray 
et al., 2002). 
 
 
FLEET & WORK-RELATED ROAD SAFETY BACKGROUND 
Previous research has highlighted work-related road safety as an area that requires further 
attention with a focus on developing interventions aimed at improving road safety outcomes 
and in turn offering huge financial savings to industry and the community (Bibbings, 1997; 
Murray et al., 2002; Haworth et al., 2000; Wishart and Davey, 2004). Traditionally, work-
related vehicle crashes/incidents have been viewed as just “accidents” by organisational 
management, suggesting an inability or want to foresee the risks or contributing factors. 
Therefore, insurance claims are completed, the vehicle repaired, and work life goes on. 
Usually the only investigation completed is a one on one interview between the driver and 
his/her Supervisor/Manager for determining the appropriate information for the incident 
and/or insurance forms. Generally, for more serious crashes, an investigation may only be 
completed by the police. Research has shown that appropriately designed, industry-based road 
safety interventions can reduce the number and severity of work-related road incidents. 
Therefore, there is an obvious and growing need for industry, government and the community 
to allocate resources and build the knowledge and expertise in this area (Wishart and Davey, 
2004). 
 
WORK-RELATED ROAD INCIDENT STATISTICS 
 
The National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (NOHSC) conducted a study on 
work-related road crash fatalities during the period of 1989-92 (cited in Haworth et al., 2000). 
Results from the research revealed that there were 541 persons killed in road crashes while 
they were working and 628 persons killed in road crashes while they were commuting to and 
from work. The fatality statistics represents 23% and 26% respectively of the 2389 work-
related deaths for the 1989-92 period (Anderson & Plowman, 1999; Haworth et al., 2000). In 
Queensland from 1997-2001, 25% of fatal road crashes and 17% of hospitalisations involved 
a commercial vehicle (CARRS-Q, 2005). However, indications suggest that the true figures 
could actually be much higher due to issues of under reporting. 
 
Lynn and Lockwood (1998) conducted a survey in work-related driving and found that 
company drivers travelled more than twice the annual distance than private car drivers 
travelled. Furthermore, from reported incident statistics revealed in the survey, Lynn and 
Lockwood (1998) suggested that after differences in demographic and exposure variables had 
been considered, company car drivers had about 50% more incidents than private drivers. 
This higher crash involvement of work-related drivers is sometimes referred to as the ‘work-
related driver effect’.  
 
COSTS DUE TO WORK-RELATED ROAD CRASHES/INCIDENTS 
 
Based on workers compensation data work-related road crash injuries are estimated to cost 
approximately $500 million per year (Murray et al., 2002; Wheatley, 1997). Research 
conducted by the Centre for Accident Research and Road Safety – Queensland (CARRS-Q) 
has shown that costs associated with work-related vehicle crashes have more often than not 
been calculated in terms of vehicle damage or write off costs. Murray et al (2002) suggested 
that work-related vehicle crash costs show an iceberg effect where the cost of crashes in terms 
of vehicle repairs is only the tip of the iceberg. Other costs not usually identified by some 
organisations consist of personal injury, medical/hospital, rehabilitation, absence from work, 
workers compensation, downtime/loss productivity and potential loss of custom (Murray et 
al., 2002), administration, loss of assets, retraining and insurance premiums (Mooren & 
Sochon, 2004). In determining the true costs of vehicle crashes a multiplier of between 3 and 
5 times vehicle repair/replacement costs should be used (Mooren & Sochon, 2004). In 
contrast, research conducted by CARRS-Q suggest that the actual vehicle crash costs could be 
somewhere between 8-36 times vehicle repair/replacement costs (Murray et al., 2002).   
  
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
 
Within Australia there is not exact uniformity of legislation in relation to work-related road 
safety, however the focus is essentially the same. Mooren and Sochon (2004) state that there 
are two key elements which primarily reflect the area of legislation. Firstly, there is road 
safety or transport legislation that governs general road use including driving hours for heavy 
vehicles as well as vehicle safety and driver qualification and regulatory frameworks. 
Secondly, organisations that operate vehicles for work are also governed by the Workplace 
Health and Safety legislation. In addition, under OH&S legislation in Australia vehicles used 
for work purposes are considered as a workplace when used on public roads and plant when 
used off public roads (Hoskins, 2003). Furthermore, in most states and territories, travel in 
vehicles for purposes of going to or returning from work is covered by workers compensation 
legislation which means that companies/organisations are liable for the relevant premiums to 
cover this activity (Mooren & Sochon, 2004).   
 
In recent years the importance of OH&S legislation, duty of care, Chain of Responsibility 
(COR), and corporate manslaughter requirements have increased in the transport and road 
safety sectors (Murray et al., 2002). The COR states that anybody, not just the driver, who has 
control in a transport operation can be held responsible for breaches of road laws and may be 
made legally liable (VicRoads, 2003). In other words all personnel associated with 
organisations involved in using road transport as a part of business, for example, consigning, 
packing, driving, operating and receiving, share responsibility for ensuring breaches of road 
laws do not occur. Under current legislation, a corporation can be found guilty of an offence 
under the Chain of Responsibility. 
 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS OF WORK-RELATED VEHICLE INCIDENTS 
 
ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS 
 
Typically, work-related vehicle incident reports reflect an asset management approach to 
crashes, describing them in terms of the type of incident, for example, ‘loss of control’ and 
‘rear end’, etc, and rarely identify any potential contributing factors that may have contributed 
to the cause of the crash, for example, fatigue, inexperience, alcohol/drugs and driver 
distraction/inattention, etc. The use of an asset management approach to reporting incidents 
does not provide a suitable means conducive to incident trend analyses and identification of 
appropriate controls or countermeasures. In addition, categorisation in this manner does not 
provide any insight into the perceptions, attitudes, safety climate and organisational culture 
contributing to crashes through the influence on human behaviour (Wishart and Davey, 2004). 
Thus previous countermeasures and initiatives fail to address the underlying contributing 
factors to crashes.  
 
Organisations commonly adopt a blameworthy methodology when reporting, investigating 
and implementing interventions within the work environment. A blameworthy approach, 
usually directed toward the driver of an incident, promotes a ‘do not admit liability’ culture 
within the organisation and even failure to report some incidents. Therefore, data received 
from an incident report may not assist the true identification of relevant contributing factors. 
 
How an organisation performs, or is required to perform, its operations may influence work-
related driver safety, for example, high mileage travel (Collingwood, 1997; Griffith, 1997), 
time pressures (Downs et al., 1999) and in particular organisational culture (Haworth et al., 
2000). Other influences may include poor maintenance procedures, poor selection of vehicles 
for the job, selection and recruitment of drivers and lack of road safety policy and procedures, 
etc. These factors may have a direct influence on a work-related road incident, for example, 
worn tyres that are overlooked due to a poor maintenance program may cause a crash. In 
contrast, organisational factors may influence driver behaviour, for example, time pressure to 
complete jobs may influence the driver to speed which in turn may contribute to the incident. 
In addition, research conducted by Murray et al. (2002) claim that a number of organisations 
believe that safety, including work-related driver safety, is not considered an operational 
priority and that senior managers are often unaware of the problem and make safety a low 
priority behind ‘getting the job done’.     
 
DRIVER BEHAVIOUR 
 
Research has shown that work-related drivers are exposed to external influences, related to 
the nature of their job, and internal influences related to their personal dispositions and other 
individual characteristics which impact on their driving practices (Newnam et al., 2002). 
Work-related vehicle drivers are at a greater risk of accident involvement, not only through 
higher levels of exposure to the road environment, but also time and scheduling pressures, 
work relationships and other distractions (Stradling et al., 2000). In turn, these issues may 
promote adverse driving behaviours, for example, aggressive driving, disregard for road rules 
and even drug/alcohol abuse. Case Study research conducted by CARRS-Q has indicated a 
link between adverse driver behaviours and organisational processes. In addition, drivers who 
obtain multiple driving infringements, for example, red light and speed cameras, and/or 
complaints by other road users are at a higher risk of being involved in vehicle incidents and 
especially in more serious incidents or crashes. If not addressed by the organisation, multiple 
incidents and/or infringements committed by a driver and eventually resulting in a serious 
crash (e.g. fatality) may leave the organisation liable to prosecution. Therefore, future fleet 
safety initiatives must take a proactive approach targeting the influences of driver behaviour.   
 
FLEET SAFETY CASE STUDIES 
 
Case study research conducted by CARRS-Q reveal similar patterns emerging across fleets in 
relation to causal and contributing factors to crashes, data reporting and recording issues, high 
risk drivers and tasks, types of crashes, and the types of vehicles involved (Wishart & Davey, 
2004). In conduction of research CARRS-Q researchers use a number of methodology 
relevant to industry, for example: 
 
a) A review of reported and recorded data including incident/crash data, infringement data 
(red light and speed camera), and complaints data (where applicable). This review will 
serve a number of specific purposes such as: 
• Providing a historical overview of incident patterns; 
• Identifying incident reporting process deficiencies; 
• Identifying incident data content recording deficiencies; 
• Highlighting high risk sectors of the vehicle fleet; 
• Identifying areas that initial intervention strategies should be targeting; and 
• Provide an incident baseline to assist in future strategy evaluation; 
 
b) Focus group discussions with both drivers and management to explore perception 
toward fleet safety and potential areas for improvement; 
 
c) Analysis and evaluation of organisational processes, for example, fleet policy, reporting 
and recording processes, investigation procedures, and past/current interventions; and 
 
d) Organisational/driver behaviour survey used to investigate and develop baseline 
measurements representative of the whole organisation prior to the implementation of 
vehicle safety intervention strategies. 
 
 
 
 
 
REPORTED INCIDENT DESCRIPTIONS 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the following includes a brief example of information 
regarding three large and diverse Queensland and nationwide industry fleets of which 
CARRS-Q has or is continuing to conduct case study research. 
 
Analysis of vehicle incidents for the three case studies illustrated four significant types of 
incidents (see Table 1), for example, Damage Whilst Parked/Parking, Reversing, Rear End 
and Hit Object. For insurance purposes the incident descriptor categorises the various 
incidents, however, the descriptor does not give any indication on the contributing causes of 
the incident. Primarily, Parking, Reversing and Hit Object type incidents are examples of low 
speed manoeuvring incidents which may indicate a number of contributing factors. For 
example, driver vision whilst reversing (how are vehicles loaded, etc), rushing/work schedule 
pressures (are drivers rushing and not taking due care), and distractions (distracted by in car 
factors including mobile phones, paperwork, eating, vehicle radio, etc or external factors 
including pedestrians and signs, etc). In addition, Rear End type incidents (especially in the 
case where the driver is at fault) indicate that drivers may be following too closely to the 
vehicle in front of them thereby reducing the amount of reaction time they have to avoid an 
incident. Therefore, contributing factors include not leaving enough braking distance 
(tailgating) and/or travelling too fast (speeding) and/or failing to pay attention to the vehicles 
in front (distraction).   
 
 
CASE STUDY 1 CASE STUDY 2 CASE STUDY 3 
Description % Description % Description % 
DWP 18.5 Rear End 23 Parking/Parked 25 
Reversing 17 DWP 18.5 Rear End 13 
Hit Object 15 Reversing 13.5 Hit Object 11 
Hit Rear 14 Hit Object 11 Unknown 7.5 
Right of Way 8.5 Fail to Give Way 6.5 Theft 7 
Accumulated Damage 8 Hit Animal 5.5 Overtaking 6.5 
Animal 5 Windscreen 3.5 Right of Way 3.5 
Hit Stationary Vehicle 3 Changing Lanes 3 Failed Lane 3 
Lost Control 
Malicious Damage 
2 
1.5 
Loss of Control 
Unknown 
3 
3 
Loading/Unloading 
Worksite Damage 
3 
3 
TOTAL 92.5 TOTAL 90.5 TOTAL 92.5 
*DWP – Damaged Whilst Parked 
 
Table 1 – Organisation Incident Description 
 
Consideration should be given for data recording and reporting mechanisms to establish true 
and consistent information and data input. Development of a standard set of incident 
descriptors which state the type of incident relative to fleet safety, for example, fatigue, 
distraction, reversing compared to general statements of where and what was being 
undertaken at the time of the incident which is more relevant to insurance processes, for 
example, parking, hit object or rear end, etc. As previously stated, crash data is used to 
identify deficiencies in the safety system processes and to aid development of intervention 
strategies.   
 
APARRENT FAULT OF INCIDENTS 
 
The proportion of 75% and 78% attributed at fault for Case Study 2 and 3 respectively (see 
Table 2) is considerably high and over represented in comparison to results obtained by 
CARRS-Q in overall fleet incidents of other vehicle fleets. Therefore, fleet safety 
countermeasures need to be specifically targeted toward both the organisation and the drivers. 
 
CASE STUDY 1 CASE STUDY 2 CASE STUDY 3 
AT FAULT % AT FAULT % AT FAULT % 
Company Driver 60 Company Driver 75 Company Driver 78 
Third Party 39 Third Party 25 Third Party 20 
      
* Company driver at fault includes single vehicle incidents. 
 
Table 2 – Apparent Fault of Incidents 
 
OTHER CRASH ANALYSES 
 
Crash data analysis is an essential tool for identifying high risk sectors within fleets. A 
number of analyses are conducted using the recorded crash data from organisations and this 
data may be recoded to explore additional fleet safety issues or deficiencies. The analysis is 
compared with other methodologies before interventions are determined. 
 
Crash data analysis includes other factors, such as: 
 
• Incidents by organisational department; 
• Numbers of incidents by individual driver; 
• Incident costs; 
• Weather conditions at time of incident; 
• Gender and age issues; 
• Time of day of incidents; 
• Trends of incidents by day of week, month, year; 
• Location of incidents (e.g. freeway, car parks, specific suburbs, etc); 
• Incident type and apparent fault; and 
• Types of vehicles including make, model and body type, etc. 
 
 
FLEET SAFETY INTERVENTIONS 
 
HISTORICAL APPROACH 
 
Historically in terms of exploring and implementing fleet safety interventions, organisations 
have often taken a “silver bullet” approach aimed at developing and implementing a single 
countermeasure or intervention strategy to encompass and address all work-related road safety 
issues (Wishart & Davey, 2004). This approach is often reactive (post incident), targeting 
either a workforce that have recorded an excessive number of incidents or drivers that have 
been involved in repeated incidents. Wishart and Davey (2004) state that one shortcoming 
with the reactive approach is that a single implemented countermeasure often results in only a 
short term fix and does not address the underlying contributing factors relating to the crash. 
Underlying contributing factors may include both organisational and behavioural issues. 
Therefore, the implementation of a single reactive countermeasure may not demonstrate a 
significant improvement in work-related vehicle safety over time. 
 
Traditionally, skills based driver training and education programs have been adopted by 
organisations in an attempt to improve the organisation’s work-related road/vehicle safety. 
Wishart and Davey (2004) state that although many of these programs are to teach road users 
the skills necessary for the successful operation of a vehicle on our roads, caution needs to be 
exercised to ensure that the distinction between performance and behaviour is recognised and 
what road users are capable of doing, and what they actually do, can be different. In other 
words, a high level of driver skill does not necessarily mean improved driver behaviour. For 
instance, Katila et al (2003) state that driver training and education programs involving a 
strong practical component such as the development of vehicle control skills, may 
inadvertently create an inflated belief in one’s own driving ability which in turn may lead to 
an increase in aggressive driving behaviour. 
 
Research has revealed that skills based driver training and education programs may not lead 
to improved work-related road/vehicle safety hence no significant reduction in vehicle 
incidents (Jerrim, 1997; Haworth et al., 2000; Skewes, 2002; Sochon & Brisbane, 2003; 
Watson et al., 1996). Mooren and Sochon (2001) further state that some organisations, noting 
the research and their own experience in work-related vehicle safety have moved away from 
driver skills training and are concentrating their efforts more on improved safety 
behaviour/culture.    
 
PROACTIVE APPROACH 
 
To effectively investigate and improve work-related fleet safety, it is necessary to collect data 
from multiple sources including drivers, eye-witnesses and police. Information of this type is 
crucial in order to better understand the nature of crashes and to enable the exploration of 
preventative measures. Relevant information may include things such as the time of day of the 
crash, the speed of the vehicles involved, the weather, road conditions and driver 
explanations. In many situations, the scope for understanding and subsequent intervention is 
dependent on both the quality and quantity of crash information recorded. 
 
A proactive approach to fleet/work-related road safety involves continuous programs to 
prevent incidents from occurring, not reacting to incidents that have already transpired, and 
typically utilise multiple fleet safety interventions.  
 
Whatever the motivation is for focussing on improving fleet safety, the first step is to gain a 
detailed understanding of the current situation or ‘where are we now’ within the organisation 
(Murray et al., 2002). Undertaking a fleet safety system ‘needs analysis’ or audit, similar to 
the audit developed by Queensland Transport (Anderson et al., 1998), is one model that will 
enable an organisation to ascertain its current fleet/work-related road safety situation and 
highlight areas requiring improvement.  Elements of a best practice fleet safety system to be 
audited may include: 
 
• Workplace Road Safety Policy; 
• Fleet Risk Management procedures (including timing/work scheduling procedures); 
• Employee recruitment and selection (satisfactory driving record); 
• Induction programs for new employees (including vehicle inductions) and 
contractors; 
• Vehicle selection and maintenance; 
• Vehicle crash involvement (reporting and recording); 
• Incentives and disincentives; 
• Training and education; 
• Evaluation and monitoring procedures. 
  
A proactive approach to fleet/work-related road safety ideally would address all the above 
elements of a Fleet Safety System, however, requirements of the organisation and nature of 
the industry will determine priorities and the level to which intervention strategies are adopted 
by the organisation.  
 
Fleet management need to be aware that the information provided by the needs analysis/audit 
often exposes deficiencies in processes, reporting, recording, and policy mechanisms without 
actually informing the design of behavioural based intervention strategies (Wishart and 
Davey, 2004). Research undertaken by CARRS-Q is currently examining the development of 
targeted intervention strategies tailored toward specific issues and directed at behaviours, 
attitudes, intentions, perceptions, organisational culture and safety climate (Wishart & Davey, 
2004). Subsequently, the results obtained from research are used to assist organisations in 
making informed choices regarding the implementation of countermeasures. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There are a variety of organisational, behavioural and cultural factors that contribute to work-
related road crashes that are not acknowledged or addressed by organisations. Historically, 
organisations have adopted a reactive approach to work-related road/vehicle incidents and 
usually focus on a single countermeasure, for example, skills based driver training, in an 
attempt to improve the organisation’s fleet safety. Past research has revealed that a single 
reactive approach is ineffective in improving long-term work-related vehicle/road safety. 
Current research shows that to improve work-related road safety, organisations need to adopt 
a proactive multiple strategy approach and target long-term intervention strategies aimed at 
not only a fleet safety system but also behavioural and cultural aspects of the organisation. 
Research conducted by CARRS-Q suggests that fleet safety intervention strategies would 
need to be tailored toward each individual organisation focussing on specific issues dependant 
on industry, organisational, behavioural and cultural requirements.   
 
 
Contact person regarding any queries regarding this paper or fleet/work-related 
road/vehicle safety is Bevan Rowland at b.rowland@qut.edu.au 
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